Reverse-engineering censorship in China: Randomized experimentation and participant observation by King, Gary et al.
Reverse-engineering censorship in
China: Randomized experimentation
and participant observation
The Harvard community has made this
article openly available.  Please share  how
this access benefits you. Your story matters
Citation King, G., J. Pan, and M. E. Roberts. 2014. “Reverse-Engineering
Censorship in China: Randomized Experimentation and Participant
Observation.” Science 345 (6199) (August 21): 1251722–1251722.
doi:10.1126/science.1251722.
Published Version doi:10.1126/science.1251722
Citable link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:37091695
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University’s DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions
applicable to Open Access Policy Articles, as set forth at http://
nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-
use#OAP
Reverse-engineering Censorship in China:
Randomized Experimentation and Participant
Observation∗
Gary King† Jennifer Pan‡ Margaret E. Roberts§
This is the draft version of our paper; the final published version of this
paper is available at http://j.mp/ChinaExp
∗For helpful advice, we thank Peter Bol, Sheena Chestnut, Peter Gries, Yoi Herrera, Haifeng Huang,
Iain Johnston, Susan Shirk, Dustin Tingley, and participants in a panel at the American Political Science
Association, August 31, 2013 and at the Midwet Political Science Association April 3, 2014. For expert
research assistance over many months, we are tremendously appreciative of the efforts and insights of
Frances Chen, Wanxin Cheng, Amy Jiang, Adam Jin, Fei Meng, Cuiqin Li, Heather Liu, Jennifer Sun,
Hannah Waight, Alice Xiang, LuShuang Xu, Min Yu, and a large number of others who we shall leave
anonymous. We thank Crimson Hexagon, Inc. for help with data. Replication data and information is
available in King, Pan, and Roberts (2014).
†Albert J. Weatherhead III University Professor, Institute for Quantitative Social Science, 1737 Cam-
bridge Street, Harvard University, Cambridge MA 02138; http://GKing.harvard.edu, king@harvard.edu,
(617) 500-7570.
‡Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Government, 1737 Cambridge Street, Harvard University, Cambridge
MA 02138; http://people.fas.harvard.edu/∼jjpan/, (917) 740-5726.
§Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Government, 1737 Cambridge Street, Harvard University, Cambridge
MA 02138; http://scholar.harvard.edu/mroberts/home
Abstract
Existing research on the extensive Chinese censorship organization uses observa-
tional methods with well-known limitations. We conduct the first large-scale exper-
imental study of censorship by creating accounts on numerous social media sites,
randomly submitting different texts, and detecting from a worldwide network of
computers which are censored. We also supplement the usual interviews with se-
cret sources by creating our own social media site, contracting with Chinese firms to
install the same censoring technologies as existing sites, and — with their software,
documentation, and even customer support — reverse engineering how it all works.
Our results offer rigorous support for the recent hypothesis that criticism of the state,
its leaders, and their policies are published, whereas posts about real world events
with collective action potential are censored.
1 Introduction
The Chinese government has implemented “the most elaborate system for internet content
control in the world” [1], marshaling hundreds of thousands of people to strategically slow
the flow of certain types of information among the Chinese people. Yet, the sheer size and
influence of this organization has made it possible for researchers to infer via passive
observation a great deal about its purpose and procedures, as well as the intentions of
the Chinese government. We seek to get around the well known inferential limitations
inherent in observational work by large scale random experimentation and participant
observation.
We begin here with the theoretical context. The largest previous study of the purpose
of Chinese censorship distinguished between the “state critique” and “collective action
potential” theories of censorship and found that, with few exceptions, the first was wrong
and the second was right: unlike most prior claims, even vitriolic criticisms of the gov-
ernment in social media are not censored but any attempt to physically move people in
ways not sanctioned by the government are. Even posts that praise the government are
censored if they pertain to real world collective action events [2].
In both theories, regime stability is the assumed ultimate goal [3, 4, 5, 6]. For exam-
ple, scholars had previously thought that the censors pruned the Internet of government
criticism and biased the remaining news in favor of the government, thinking that oth-
ers would be less moved to action on the ground as a result [7, 8, 9]. However, even
if biasing news positively would in fact reduce the potential for collective action, this
state critique theory of censorship misses the value to the central government and central
Party organization of the information content provided by open criticism in social media
[10, ?, ?, 11]. After all, much of the job of leaders in an autocratic system is to keep
the people sufficiently mollified so they will not take action that may impact their hold
on power. In line with the literature on responsive authoritarianism, knowing that a local
leader or government bureaucrat is engendering severe criticism, perhaps because of cor-
ruption or incompetence, is valuable information [?, ?]. That leader can then be replaced
with someone more effective at maintaining stability, and the system can then be seen as
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responsive. This responsiveness would seem likely to have a considerably larger effect on
reducing the probability of collective action than merely biasing the news in predictable
ways.
The collective action potential hypothesis holds that the Chinese censorship organi-
zation first detects a volume burst of social media posts within a specific topic area, and
identifies the real world event that gives rise to the volume burst [2]. If the event was
classified as having collective action potential, then all posts within the burst were cen-
sored, regardless of whether they were critical or supportive of the state and its leaders.
Unlike the uncertain process involved in coherently classifying individual posts as to their
collective action potential, this procedure is easily implemented with extremely high lev-
els of inter-coder reliability. No evidence exists as to whether these rules were invented
and directed by a person or committee in the Chinese government are merely an emergent
pattern of this large scale activity.
Although the largest existing study analyzed study analyzed more than 11 million
social media posts from almost 1,400 web sites across China [2], it along with other
quantitative studies of censorship [12, 13] are solely observational, meaning that some
conclusions necessarily depend upon untestable assumptions. For example, the data for
these studies is controlled by an earlier stage where many social media web sites use au-
tomated review (based on techniques like keyword matching) to immediately move large
numbers of prospective posts into a temporary limbo to receive extra scrutiny before possi-
ble publishing (for a guide, see Figure 1). Whereas the ex post content filtering decision is
conducted largely by hand and takes up to about 24 hours, the ex ante decision of whether
posts are slotted for review is automated, instantaneous, and thus cannot be detected by
observational methods. Importantly, this also means that the automated review process
could induce selection bias in existing studies of censorship which can only observe those
submissions that are not stopped from publication by automated review. And of course
observational research generally also risks endogeneity bias, confounding bias, and other
problems.
To avoid these potential biases, and to study how automated review works, we conduct
2
a large scale experimental study, where random assignment controlled by the investiga-
tors substitutes for statistical assumptions. We do this by creating accounts on numerous
social media sites across China; writing a large number of unique social media posts;
randomizing assignment of different types of posts to accounts; and, to evade detection,
observing from a network of computers all over the world which types are published or
censored. Throughout, we attempted to avoid disturbing the flow of normal discourse
by producing social media content on topics similar to those in real social media posts
(including the content of those censored, which our methods can access). Although very
small scale nonrandomized efforts to post on Chinese websites and observe censorship
have been informative [14], randomized experiments have not before been used in the
study of Chinese censorship.
In addition to our randomized experiment, which we use to make causal inferences,
we also seek to produce more reliable descriptive knowledge of how the censorship pro-
cess works — information important in its own right, intensely studied and contested in
the academic and policy communities, and ultimately essential also for any causal study.
Gathering this information, until now, has mostly come from highly confidential inter-
views with censors or their agents at social media sites or in government, information that
is necessarily partial, incomplete, potentially unsafe for research subjects, and otherwise
difficult to gather. We add a new source of information that has not been attempted before
in studies of censorship through participant observation. Most importantly, this enabled us
to change the incentive structure of our informants. Thus, from inside China, we created
our own social media website, purchased a URL, rented server space, contracted with one
of the most popular software platforms in China used to create these sites, submitted, au-
tomatically reviewed, posted, and censored our own submissions. The website we created
is not available to anyone other than our research team to avoid affecting the object of our
study or otherwise interfering with existing Chinese social media discourse. However, in
doing so, we had complete access to the software, documentation, help forums, and ex-
tensive consultation with support staff; we were even able to get their recommendations
on how to conduct censorship on our own site to adhere to government standards. The
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“interviews” we conducted in this way were unusually informative because the job of our
sources was in fact to answer the questions we posed.
Overall, this work offers three intended contributions. First, by analyzing large num-
bers of posts at numerous social media sites, we are able to resolve some disagreements in
the policy and academic literatures on the subject, such as explanations for the presence
of conflicting keyword lists and the absence of a coherent or unified interpretation for the
operation of these lists at individual sites. Consistent with this disagreement, we show
that the large number of local social media sites in China have considerable flexibility,
and choose diverse technical and software options, in implementing censorship. Second,
we show that the automated review process affects large numbers of posts on fully two-
thirds of Chinese social media sites, but is a largely ineffective step in implementing the
government’s censorship goals. This is surprising but consistent with the known poor
performance of most keyword-based approaches to text classification. Finally, despite
automated review’s large presence, high potential for generating selection bias in obser-
vational studies, and overall ineffectiveness due to keyword matching, we find that the
government is still able accomplish its objectives — as summarized by the collective ac-
tion potential hypothesis — by using very large numbers of human coders to produce post
hoc corrections to automated review and to censorship in general. Our research offers
clear support for the collective action potential hypothesis and then offers some signifi-
cant extensions. We find, consistent with the implications of this theory, but untested in
prior research, that posts about collective action events outside mainland China, collective
action events occurring solely online, social media posts containing critiques of top lead-
ers, and posts about highly sensitive topics such as Tibet and Xinjing not during collective
action events, are not censored.
In Section 2, we summarize our experimental designs, and the unusual logistical dif-
ficulties in engineering and executing them in this context (with additional details in the
supplementary materials). This design section also covers our participant observation ap-
proach in creating a social media site, which helps us more carefully define the process we
will experiment on. Section 3 presents our results and Section 4 pushes the collective ac-
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tion potential theory until it breaks so that we can find the edges of where it is applicable.
Section 5 concludes.
2 Research Designs
We now describe the challenges involved in large scale experimentation, participant ob-
servation, and data collection in a system designed to prevent the free flow of information,
especially about the censors. These include avoiding detection so we were not prevented
from carrying out our study, implementation on the ground in many geographically distant
places, keeping a large research team safe, and ensuring that we do not disturb or alter the
system we are studying. The human subjects aspects of our experimental protocol were
pre-approved by our university’s Institutional Review Board. For obvious reasons, we
are unable to reveal certain details of how we implemented this design, but we do give
complete information on the statistical and scientific logic behind our choices, which are
straightforward.1
We begin with the outcome variable we are studying and then describe our experimen-
tal protocols.
2.1 Participant Observation
Aspects of the process by which censors in the Chinese government and social media
companies implement censorship directives have been gleaned over the years in interviews
with sources that have first hand knowledge, including the censors themselves. We have
also conducted many such interviews, and each one produces some information, but it is
necessarily a partial picture, highly uncertain, and potentially unsafe for the sources and
researchers.
Thus, we looked for a way to learn more by changing the incentives of our sources.
We did this by creating our own Chinese social media site from inside China, using all the
1We also added our own ethics rules, not required by the IRB, which dictates that we avoid, wherever
possible, influencing or disturbing the system we are studying. The similarity to The Prime Directive in
Star Trek notwithstanding, this seems like the appropriate stance for scientists attempting to understand
the world, as distinct from advocates trying to change it, and in any event is more likely to yield reliable
inferences. Further details can be found in our supplementary materials.
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infrastructure, procedures, and rules that existing sites must follow. To do this, we pur-
chased a URL, contracted with a company that provides hosting services, and arranged
with another company to acquire the software necessary to establish a community discus-
sion forum (a Bulletin Board System (BBS)). We downloaded the software and installed
it ourselves. This infrastructure gave us complete access to the software and its documen-
tation so that we could fully understand and utilize its functionality. Importantly, we also
had easy access to support employees at these firms, who were happy to help show us
how to censor so that our website remained in accordance with their view of government
requirements. Thus, instead of trying to convince people to spare some of their time for
researchers, we were able to have conversations with employees whose jobs it is to answer
questions like those we posed, and fortunately they seem quite good at their jobs. We then
studied and customized the software, submitted posts ourselves, and used the software’s
mechanisms to censor some. We took every step we could short of letting individuals in
China post on the site to avoid causing any interference to actual social media discourse.
The biggest surprise we found relative to the literature was the huge variety of techni-
cal methods by which automated review and human censorship can be conducted. Table
1 summarizes some of these options.
When we installed the software, we found that, by default, it included no automated
review or blocking. But webmasters can easily change the option of automatically review-
ing specific types of users (those who are moderators, super users, users who have been
banned from posting, or those who have been banned from visiting the site), internet pro-
tocol (IP) address, new threads, or every response — all of which can be tailored for each
of as many forums as is set up on each website. Functionality also exists to bulk delete
posts, which can be implemented by date range, user name, user IP, content containing
certain keywords, or by length of post. On the backend, the webmaster also has flexible
search tools to examine content, to search by user name, post titles, or post content. What
the user sees can also be limited: the search function can be disabled for users, webmas-
ters have the option of whether to allow users to see whether or what posts of theirs are
being automatically reviewed.
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Table 1: Options for Content Filtering on Forum Platform
1. Automated Review Options
Content-based review can be based on:
- moderator-supplied key-
words
- review specific to post
type (e.g. comment or
main post)
-plugins for review-
ing posts with minimal
influence on the user
- review specific to forum
topic
-plugins advertising better
keyword blocking technol-
ogy
User-based review can be based on:
- user IP - previous user posts
- payments by user - last login
- points won by user (e.g.
for number of posts, com-
ments)
Time-period review and censorship allows:
- periods of time where all
posts are audited
- disallow posting during
certain hours of the day
Workflow for reviewed posts:
- different censors for dif-
ferent types of postings
(e.g. spam vs. political
content)
- review interface with
search functionality
- batch deletion of posts
2. Account Blocking Options
- blocking for specific
types of posts (e.g. com-
ment or main post)
- blocking based on user IP
-blocking for specific fo-
rums
- blocking posting and/or
reading
- blocking based on points
We found employees of the software application company to be forthcoming when
we asked for recommendations as to which technologies have been most useful to their
other clients in following government information management guidelines. Based on
their recommendations, as well as user guides, detailed analyses from probing the sys-
tem, and additional personal interviews (with sources granted anonymity), we deduce that
most social media websites that conduct automatic review do so via a version of keyword
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matching, probably using hand-curated sets of keywords (we reverse engineer the specific
keywords below).2
Based on what we learned, we summarize the censorship process in Figure 1. The
process begins when one writes and submits a blog or microblog post at a social media
web site (left). This post is either published immediately (top left node) or held for review
before publication (middle left node in red). If the post is published immediately, it may
be manually read by a censor within about 24 hours and, depending on the decision, either
remains online indefinitely (top box) or is removed from the Internet (second box). As
can be seen from the screen shots of actual web sites in Figure 1 (with full examples in
the supplementary materials), the decisions of the censors, and the fact that they are by
the censors, are unambiguous.
The censors then read each post in review (usually within a day or two) and either
publish the post (third box of Figure 1) or delete it before publication (fourth box of
Figure 1). We are able to identify review when it occurs because typically a message is
given after post submission that informs the user the text has been slotted for review. In
the absence of a warning message, the user can tell when a post is put into review because
no public URL is associated with the post, and the user’s account page will show the status
of the post as “under review”. Finally, on the basis of the current and previous posts, a
submitted post can be censored and the account blocked so that no additional posts may
be made (last box of Figure 1). In this last case, when a user submits a text for posting,
an error message notifying the user of account blocking is encountered. A key point is
that the massive data set in [2] corresponds only to the first three boxes, whereas in our
experiment we are able to study all five paths down the decision tree.
2.2 Experimental Protocol
We now give the experimental protocol which we designed to make causal inferences
without certain modeling assumptions. We first selected 100 social media sites, includ-
ing 97 of the top blogging sites in the country, representing 87% of blog posts now on
2In the process of setting up the site, they recommended that we hire 2-3 censors for every 50,000 users.
That enables us to back out an estimate of the total number of censors hired within firms at between 50,000
and 75,000, not counting censors within government, 50 cent party members, or the Internet police.
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Figure 1: The Chinese Censorship Decision Tree: The pictures shown are examples of
real (and typical) web sites, along with our translations. Observational studies are based
only on the first three paths through this decision tree; our experimental study includes all
five. Full screen shots are in our supplementary materials.
the web, and including the top three microblogging (i.e., Twitter-like) sites, sina weibo
(weibo.com), tencent weibo (t.qq.com), and sohu weibo (t.sohu.com). The first two of
these microblogging sites each include over 500 million registered users, and 50-100 mil-
lion daily active users.3 Together, the 100 sites are geographically spread all over China
and are divided among those run by the government (ng = 20), state-owned enterprises
(ns = 25), and private firms (np = 55). Some cater to national audiences, whereas some
only allow those local to post. Creating accounts on some of these sites requires the user
to be in the country, at a specific geographic locale, have a local email address, or provide
another method of communication for identification. We devised procedures to create two
accounts at each of these social media sites.
We kept our design close to aspects of [2]. The theory in that paper was not that every
3See [15, 16] for numbers of registered users which are substantial even if we account for automated
sites created by marketing firms [17].
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social media post with the potential to generate collective action is censored. After all,
almost any issue could in principle be used as a hook to generate protest activity. Instead,
the theory is that (pro- or anti-government) posts concerning a collective action event
are censored. Collective action events are those “which (a) involve protest or organized
crowd formation outside the Internet; (b) relate to individuals who have organized or
incited collective action on the ground in the past; or (c) relate to nationalism or nationalist
sentiment that have incited protest or collective action in the past.” [2, p.6].
We conducted three rounds of experiments (April 18-28, June 24-29, and June 30-July
4, 2013), during which social media posts would need to be written in real time about cur-
rent issues, making the logistics challenging. At the beginning of each round, we scoured
the news and selected on-going collective action events and non-collective action events
about which there was a significant volume of social media discussion. We chose a ratio
of one collective action event to two non-collective events, since collective action events
are more scarce and so that we can average over different non-collective action events. We
included non-collective action events only if they were widely discussed topics pertaining
to actions taken by the Chinese government, officials, or the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP), which are unrelated to events with collective action potential. We also attempted
where possible to select events that mentioned specific officials’ names and addressed
what has been described as especially “sensitive” topics. (We also included several edge
cases described in Section 4.) Details of all events appear in the supplementary materials,
but here are the four collective action events we found when our study was conducted, all
of which meet the definition but some of which are more incendiary than others:
1. Qui Cuo, a 20 year old mother self-immolated to protest China’s repressive policies
over Tibet. Her funeral drew protesters.
2. Protesters in Panxu, a village in Xiamen Fujian, took to the streets because they
claim officials did not adequately compensate them for requisitioning their collec-
tively owned farmland to build a golf course. Village representatives went to local
authorities to demand compensation but were instead detained. Thousands of vil-
lagers went to the town hall to demand the release of the village representatives,
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police moved in to arrest the villagers, villagers retaliated by smashing police cars,
and taking the local Party secretary into custody.
3. On the second anniversary of the 2011 arrest of artist-dissident Ai Weiwei, he re-
leased an album that talks about his imprisonment. Ai Weiwei was arrested in 2011
on charges of tax evasion, but more likely either for calling his followers to mimic
the Arab Spring or for organizing volunteers to collect the names of children who
died in the Sichuan earthquake. The release of the album by Ai Weiwei is chosen as
an example of collective action under part (b) of the definition, where posts about
individuals who have organized or incited collective action on the ground in the past
are censored.
4. An altercation between Uyghurs (a minority ethnic group) protesting and local po-
lice in Lekeqin township of Shanshan county in Turpan, Xinjiang. 24 were killed,
including 16 Uyghurs. Police and many official news reports of the event attribute it
as an act of Uyghur terrorism, but rumors circulated in social media that the protest
was precipitated by forced housing demolition.
For each event, we had a group of native Chinese speakers write some posts supportive
and others critical of the government based on example social media posts that had already
appeared online, including posts which were censored as well as those that remained
online. (We used the technology of [2] to obtain access to the censored posts.) In other
words, we obtain posts that are immediately published after submission, including those
which remain online and those which are removed (top two boxes of Figure 1). We
provided our writers with background on the event, the definition of what we mean by
pro- and anti-government for each topic (see the online supplement), and examples of real
posts from Chinese social media similar to those we needed written. So that we could
minimize any experimenter effect, we checked each text ourselves by hand and attempted
throughout to ensure that the posts we submitted were similar in language, sentiment, and
content to those already found in (or written and censored in) Chinese social media.
From a statistical point of view, we blocked [18] on three variables: First, our posts
included the same keywords in both the treatment and control conditions. Second, we
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controlled for individual writing style by blocking on author in our experimental design.
That is, posts in each set of four experimental conditions (defined by our two variables:
pro/anti government, and with/without collective action potential) was authored by the
same set of research assistants. And finally, we constrained all posts to be between 100
and 200 characters in length. In addition, we also ensured that no two posts submitted
were exactly identical to each other or to any we found in social media. All posts were
submitted between 8am and 8pm China time from the U.S. or from the appropriate place
within China, depending on what was feasible because of the technology used at each
social media site.4
We were interested in testing the causal effect of both pro- vs. anti-government con-
tent and collective action vs. non-collective action content, leading by cross-classification
to four logical treatment categories. To make the most efficient use of each individual
account, we submitted two posts to each. But it makes little sense for one account (rep-
resenting a single person) to write both pro- and anti-government posts regarding the
same event. Thus, we submitted posts about two different events to each account which
were pro-government collective action and anti-government noncollective action, or in-
stead anti-government collective action and pro-government non-collective action. In this
way, every account contributes to the causal effect estimate of each hypothesis. We also
ensured our ability to make causal inferences without extra modeling assumptions by ran-
domizing (a) the choice between these two pairs, (b) the order within each pair, and (c)
the specific collective action and policy events we wrote about in each submission. Miss-
ingness can occur when web sites are down, if an account we created expired, or if an
account is blocked due to prior posts. Largely because of the design, any missingness will
be almost exactly independent of our two treatment variables; empirically that proved to
be the case.
Each of the 100 different social media web sites in our study offers different ways of
4All posts were made to mainland China accounts. Some were submitted from outside China, when it
feasible, and many from within China. Recent work has noted that overseas accounts are subject to less
stringent censorship regulations than mainland accounts [19]. This issue does not affect our work since all
accounts created and used are mainland China accounts. Users can control account location when creating
the account by specifying a location in China, by entering local mobile number, or by creating the account
from a local IP address. We used all of the latter methods.
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expressing oneself online. When possible, we submit posts on the home page we created
for each account. For discussion forums, we start a new thread with the content of the
post in the most popular sub-forum. On sites where creating new threads by users is not
permitted, we submit posts as a reply to an existing thread relevant to the topic. In all
cases, we write our posts so as not to stand out from the stream of existing information,
following all social media, web site, and cultural norms. In total, we wrote 1,200 posts by
hand, every one unique, and none referring to each other.5
After submitting a post, we observed whether it was caught by the process of auto-
mated review; if in automated review whether and when it was eventually published; and
if not caught by the automated review process whether it was eventually censored after
the fact or it remained on the web. When a post appeared on the web, we recorded the
URL and verified censorship from computers inside and outside of China. We recorded
the outcome in terms of censorship, which corresponds to the branches of the decision
tree in Figure 1.
Throughout, our goal was that anyone looking at the submissions we wrote would
have no any idea this was part of an academic research project, was not different than what
they might find otherwise, and would not in any way disrupt or change the social media
ecosystem we were studying. We also needed to ensure that our checking published posts
for censorship was not obtrusive. So far as we are aware, no one outside of our research
team and confidants were aware of this experiment before we made this paper available,
and no one on the web indicated any suspicion about or undue attention toward any of our
posts.
3 Results
We find that in aggregate, automated review affects a remarkably large portion of the
social media landscape in China. In total, 66 of the 100 sites in our sample (automatically)
5For each of our three rounds, we wrote 200 posts on non-collective action events (split equally between
pro- and anti-government), 200 posts on collective action events or edge cases described in Section 4 (again
split equally between pro- and anti-government). Thus, 600 posts submitted relate to non-collective action
events, and 600 relate to collective action events or edge cases. We have in total 4 collective events and 2
edge cases, and so 400 posts focused on collective action events, and 200 on edge cases.
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review at least some social media submissions, and 40% of all of our individual social
media submissions from our 100 sites (and 52% of submissions from sites which review
at least sometimes) are put into review. Of those submissions which go into review, 63%
never appear on the web.
These figures indicate that automated review affects a large component of intended
speech in China and so deserves systematic attention from researchers. This is especially
so because of conflicting conclusions and lack of a unified interpretation in the academic
and policy literatures about which keywords provoke action by the government, how auto-
mated review works, and what impact this process ultimately has on the content of speech
which is blocked and which can be consumed by the Chinese people [20, 21]. We offer a
possible resolution to these issues here.
3.1 Censorship
Using our broader sample, unaffected by selection during the automated review process,
and with our experimental randomization, we begin by testing the collective action poten-
tial hypothesis. Based on a difference in means between the treatment and control groups,
the black dots in the left panel of Figure 2 summarize the point estimate for the causal
effects on censorship of submitting posts about four separate collective action events. The
vertical lines are 95% confidence intervals (as with all our figures). The effects are sub-
stantial, ranging from about 20 to 40 percentage point differences (denoted on the vertical
axis) solely due to writing about an ongoing collective action event as compared to an
ongoing noncollective action event.
We also go a step further examine some of the other decision paths in Figure 1. To
do this, we estimate the “causal mediation effect” [22, 23] of submitting posts about col-
lective action events (vs noncollective action events) on censorship and find that almost
none of this effect post content is mediated through automated review: the overall effect
is a trivial 0.003 probability, with a 95% confidence interval of (−0.007, 0.016); details
appear in the Supplement. The (non)effect for each of the four collective action events
we studied is displayed in the right panel of Figure 2, and each is similarly approximately
zero, with a small confidence interval. Review, which appears to be fully automated, is
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Figure 2: The Causal Effect on Censorship of Posts with Collective Action Potential
(left panel) and The Mediation Effect of Review (right panel): Collective action events
are more highly censored than non-collective action events within the same time period.
However, censorship of collective action events is not mediated through automated review.
thus applied in a manner independent of other relevant variables and like most keyword-
only methods of automated text analysis, it does not appear to work well at scale. From
this result, it even appears that the censors largely ignore it or at least do not get much
information from it. (We study this in more detail in the next section.)
In parallel to the large causal effect for collective action, Figure 3 reports tests of
the state critique hypothesis for each of our four collective action events and eight (non-
collective action) policy events. The black dots summarize point estimates of the causal
effect of submitting posts in favor of the government vs opposed to the government about
each event. As can be seen, the dots are all very close to the horizontal dashed line,
drawn at zero effect, with six dots above and six below, and all but one of the confidence
intervals crossing the zero line. Note especially that there is no hint of more censorship of
anti-government posts when they involve topics that might be viewed as more sensitive or
which specifically mention the names of Chinese leaders (see Supplementary Appendix
for contextual details). This finding runs counter to anecdotal evidence that rumors and
names of leaders unrelated to collective action lead to censorship.
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Figure 3: The Causal Effect on Censorship of Posts For or Against the Government:
Posts that support the government are not more or less likely to be censored than posts
that oppose the government, within the same topic.
3.2 Automated Review
The overall results in favor of the collective action potential hypothesis and against the
state critique hypotheses thus appear unambiguous. The automated review process has a
nearly undetectable effect on evidence about that hypothesis, since the human censors cor-
rect errors after the keyword matching techniques are applied in automated review (even
though even incorrect keyword filtering slows down communications on many subjects).
We now go back up the decision tree of Figure 1 to study the automated review process
more directly.
We first notice that not all websites have automated review turned on, and that the
method of censorship varies enormously by website (this is also true for account block-
ing, which we describe further in the online supplement). This is consistent with what
we learned from creating our own social media site, where the software platform not only
allows the option of whether to review, but also offers a large variety of choices of the
criteria by which to review. Indeed, there exists considerable diversity in the technolo-
gies used by different social media sites for automated review [13]. It is this diversity in
technology across sites, then, which appears to account for why different researchers typ-
ically find different patterns when looking at different sites, or at specific issues, such as
which keywords are used to detect posts to be caught in automated censorship processes.
This also accounts for why researchers have been unable to offer unified interpretations of
what they observe consistent with reasonable assumptions about the goals of the Chinese
16
leadership. It is only by looking at the whole process at scale does the simplicity of the
Chinese government’s goals become clear.
Why would the government allow for a free choice from a large number of censorship
methods, in the course of providing top down, authoritarian control? To answer this ques-
tion, we collected detailed information about all software platforms and plugins available
for purchase or license by social media sites to control information. From this study, we
conclude that the government is (perhaps intentionally) promoting innovation and compe-
tition in the technologies of censorship. Such decentralization of policy implementation
as a technique to promote innovation is common in China [24, 25, 26, 27].
Based on interviews with those involved in the process, we also find a great deal
of uncertainty over the exact censorship requirements and the precise rules for which
the government would interfere with the operation of social media sites, especially for
smaller sites with limited government connections. This uncertainty is in part a result of
encouraging innovation, but it may also in some situations be a means of control as well–it
being easier to keep people away from a fuzzy line than a clearly drawn one.
We begin a systematic empirical study by understanding which social media websites
use any automated review process. Figure 4 presents a density estimate (a continuous
version of a histogram) of the distribution of the proportion of posts reviewed for three
types of sites, depending on ownership. As can be seen, it is government sites that have the
highest probability of a post being put into review, followed by the state owned enterprises,
followed last by privately owned sites (which tend to have the largest user bases).
Why would government sites be more likely to delay publication until after automated
review, whereas private sites publish first and make censorship decisions later? So far as
we can tell from qualitative evidence, the reason is the penalty for letting offending posts
through differs between government and private sites. A government worker who fails to
stem collective action could lose his or her job immediately; in contrast, a worker in a pri-
vate site that makes the same mistake cannot usually be directly fired by the government.
Indeed, government workers have a historical legacy of prioritizing following orders and
not making mistakes, even if it is considerably more inefficient to do so [28]. Private
17
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Figure 4: Histogram (density estimate) of the proportion of posts reviewed by site. The
graph shows that government-controlled social media sites catch more posts by automated
review much more than privately owned sites; social media sites controlled by State-
Owned Enterprises (SOE) are in the middle.
sites, on the other hand, have incentives to publish as much as they can so as to attract
more users. A private site can of course be taken down entirely, but that kind of “nuclear
option” is used less often than more generalized pressure on the leadership of the private
social media sites.
What are these largely government sites reviewing? In a manner directly parallel to
Figures 2 and 3 for the ultimate variable of censorship, we now conduct an analysis of
the effects on automated review of collective action and pro and anti-government posts.
Figure 5 gives results for the effect of collective action on review: they include four
positive estimated effects but two are small and three are have zero inside their confidence
intervals. If the goal of the censors is to capture collective action events, the automated
algorithm is performing marginally at best, although this is quite common for keyword
algorithms which tend to work well for specific examples for which they can be designed
but often have low rates of sensitivity and specificity when used for large numbers of
documents.
Also interesting is the causal effect of pro- vs anti-government posts in Figure 6. These
are all small, and most of the confidence intervals cross zero. In fact, if there exists a
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Figure 5: Causal Effect on Review of Collective Action Potential Events: Collective
action events are overall slightly more likely to be reviewed than non-collective action
events.
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Figure 6: Causal Effect on Review of Posts For or Against the Government: Automated
review picks up slighly more posts that are for the government as compared to posts that
are against the government.
nonzero relationship here, it is that submissions in favor of the government are reviewed
more often than those against the government! Indeed, 9 of 12 point estimates are above
zero, and two even have their entire confidence interval above zero. This seems like more
of a mystery: government social media sites are slightly more likely to delay publication
of submissions that favor the government, its leaders, or their policies. Private sites don’t
use automated review much at all. Why is this? We found that the answer again is the
highly inexact keyword algorithms used to conduct the automated review.
To understand this better, we reverse engineer the Chinese keyword algorithms in
order to discover the keywords that distinguish submissions reviewed from those not re-
viewed. Because the number of unique words written overwhelms the number of pub-
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lished posts, we cannot find these keywords uniquely. However, we identify words highly
associated with review using a “term frequency, inverse document frequency” algorithm
[29, 30]. That is, we take the frequency of each word within the review posts and divide
this number by the number of non-reviewed documents in which that same word appears.
Thus for every word we have a measure of its frequency in review posts, relative to posts
that were not reviewed. Words with high values on these measures are likely to be used
within the automated review process.
Table 2 gives the top keywords (and keyphrases) we estimate were used to select posts
we wrote into automated review. We can see that the words associated with review could
plausibly detect collective action and relate to the government and its actions, but are
also just as likely to appear in pro-government posts as in anti-government posts. For
example, more pro- than anti-government posts are reviewed in the Corruption Policy
topic in Figure 4. This appears to be because the reviewed pro-government posts used the
word corruption (腐败) more frequently than anti-government posts. However, corruption
was used in the context of praising how the new policy would strengthen anti-corruption
(反腐败) efforts. Not only is automated review only conducted by a subset of websites
and largely ineffective at detecting posts related to collective action events, but it also can
backfire by delaying the publication of pro-government material.
It turns out that we can also offer a test of the veracity of these keywords. In the
context of setting up our own web site, we unearthed a list of keywords for review that a
software provider offered to their clients running social media web sites. The list is dated
to April 2013, and all of the keywords we found related to events taking place prior to
April 2013 were on this list. The exceptions were from events that occurred after April
2013.
It thus appears that the workers in government-controlled web sites are so risk adverse
that they have marshaled a highly error prone methodology to try to protect themselves.
They apparently know not to take this automated review methodology very seriously as,
whether it is used or not, the manual process of reading individual posts is still used widely
since our results show that automated reivew does not affect the causal effect of collective
20
Chinese English
群众 masses
政府 government
事件 incident
恐怖 terror
新疆 Xinjiang
中国 China
上街 go on the streets
李天一 Li Tianyi
法律 law
达赖 Dalai Lama
游行 demonstration
香港 Hong Kong
行贿 to bribe
腐败 corruption
Table 2: Top keywords distinguishing posts held vs not held for review. Words within
this list match keyword lists provided by the software provider.
action events on censorship decisions.
4 Edge Cases
We now attempt to define the outer boundaries of the theory of collective action potential
by choosing cases close to, but outside, the theory and look for no effect, and one inside
(criticism of the top leaders) but extreme.
Internet-Only and External-Only Collective Action The first case is an event that
had collective action taking place but only on the Internet. At the end of May, 2013, the
principal of Hainan Wanning City No. 2 Elementary School was being investigated for
taking six elementary school girls to a hotel. Ye Haiyan, a women’s rights advocate went
to the elementary school and protested with a sign in her hand that read “Principal: get
a hotel room with me, let the elementary students go! Contact Telephone: 12338 (Ye
Haiyan).” Ye’s protest went viral and her sign became an online meme, where netizens
would take and share photos of themselves, holding a sign saying the same thing with
their own phone numbers or often with China’s 911 equivalent (110) as the contact phone
21
-0
.2
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
C
en
so
rs
hi
p 
D
iff
er
en
ce
 (E
ve
nt
 - 
N
on
-C
A
 E
ve
nt
)
Hong Kong
Protests
Child-Abuse
Internet
Protests
-0
.2
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
C
en
so
rs
hi
p 
D
iff
er
en
ce
 
 (C
or
ru
pt
io
n 
- N
on
-C
or
ru
pt
io
n 
E
ve
nt
)
Corruption 
 Policy Investigation
of Sichuan
Vice Governor
Li Tianyi
Scandal
Figure 7: Testing Edge Cases for the Causal Effect of Collective Action Potential (left
panel) and of Posts About Corruption (right panel)
number.6
The second event occurred on July 1, 2013, which was the 16th anniversary of the
handover of sovereignty of Hong Kong from Britain to China. Every year on this day,
thousands take to the streets of Hong Kong in protest, but typically with little or no such
protest on the mainland. In 2013, between 30,000 people (according to the police) and
430,000 people (according to the organizers) took to the streets to call for true democracy
and Chief Executive CY Leung’s resignation.7
Neither of these “edge case” examples meet the definition of collective action events
given in Section 2, but they are obviously close. We ran our experimental design for these
events too, and give the results in the left panel of Figure 7. In both cases, the overall
causal effect is near zero, with confidence intervals that overlap zero. There is a hint of
a possibly positive effect only for posts reviewed about Hong Kong protests, but in the
context of the natural variability of Figures 2 and 3 is not obviously different from zero.
Corruption and Wrong-Doing among Senior Leaders Next, we study the effects of
writing about corruption and wrong-doing among senior leaders in the government, Party,
and military on censorship. Nothing in the theory of collective action potential supports
this effect but, because corruption so directly implicates leaders who could control censor-
ing, considerable suspicion exists in the literature that posts about corruption are censored
6For examples see [31].
7For news coverage of the protests, see [32, 33, 34, 35].
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[12, 20, 14]. We can even point to the odd result regarding this topic that posts supporting
the government’s efforts to deal with corruption are more censored than posts opposed to
the government’s efforts to deal with corruption (see Figure 6).
We selected three corruption-related topics for the analysis. The first relates to a new
corruption policy that imposes criminal charges against bribes exceeding 10,000 Chi-
nese yuan. The second topic relates to the investigation of Guo Yongxiang, a member
of the Sichuan Province Central Committee and a Vice-Governor of Sichuan for serious
breaches in discipline. The final topic relates to the naming of Li Tianyi, the son of a
well-known People’s Liberation Army performer Li Shuangjiang, for participating in a
gang-rape. The Li Tianyi case led to speculations of corruption that Li’s father’s ties to
the People’s Liberation Army would allow Li to avoid punishment commiserate with his
crimes. The results for an analysis of three corruption events appear in the right panel of
Figure 7, all of which clearly show no effect, thus again supporting the theory of collective
action potential. Similarly supportive is the fact that posts in these topics name specific
Chinese government and CCP leaders, both at central and local levels of government (see
the online supplement).
Top Leaders and Highly Sensitive Issues Finally, we study the question of the censor-
ship of discussions about top Chinese leaders, arguments for deep political reform, and
discussion of highly sensitive or salient issues. We study these topics with observational
methods.
To study more directly whether Chinese censors allow direct criticism of top leaders,
we begin by finding a social media volume burst about Chinese President Xi Jinping that
(1) by our specific definitions does not have collective action potential, (2) includes posts
that cover meaningful and important topics, and (3) is about a topic that could generate
highly critical posts about the leader. We found the following volume burst that met these
conditions.
On December 28, 2013, President Xi Jinping visited a Feng Qing Steamed Bun Shop
in Beijing (Feng Qing is a chain restaurant), and ate steamed buns “just like the rest of
us.” He waited in line, he paid 21 CNY for steamed pork and onion buns along with a
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side of stir-fried liver, and he brought his own tray to a table. Xi’s visit unleashed a storm
of traditional media coverage and a large volume burst on social media. Although Xi’s
visit to the bun shop sounds like an innocuous event, online discussions related the visit
to important and high profile issues such as Xi’s China Dream, corruption of government
officials, rising real estate prices, the plight of China’s elderly and impoverished, as well as
propaganda, censorship, the absence of elections, and multi-party competition. However,
this event is not connected to any on-going collective action events.
During this volume burst, we collected 82,280 social media posts related to this event
before any posts were censored, and then checked each one from a network of computers
around the world which were eventually censored. Finally, we applied the Hopkins-King
algorithm [36] (using a training set of 592 hand coded posts) to determine the proportion
of censored posts that were critical vs. supportive posts, and applied the Bayesian algo-
rithm derived in [2] to invert this. We found, consistent with the collective action potential
hypothesis, that posts critical of President Xi were censored just about as much as those
which were supportive. Among posts that are critical of Xi and his actions, 18% (with
a 95% confidence interval of 13–22%) are censored. Among the posts supportive of Xi
the percent censored is 14% (with a 95% confidence interval of 8–22%). (The proportion
of posts censored among posts that simply describe the event is 21%, with a confidence
interval of 18-24%).
The supplementary materials include the text of examples of uncensored posts that are
highly critical of President Xi and which use this event to discuss important issues. These
posts involve many vivid personal attacks on Xi and his policies. In our experience, these
posts are not surprising or unusual.
Next, we look for uncensored discussion of deep political reform. In August of 2013,
three commentaries were published in People’s Daily condemning constitutionalism, de-
scribing constitutionalism as incompatible with socialism and doomed to fail in China.
These commentaries sparked a social media volume burst with intensive online discus-
sions about whether China should adopt American style constitutionalism and multi-party
competition. In the days following these commentaries, we collected a random sample of
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9,850 blog posts related to political reform. While there are posts that toe the party line
and criticize constitutionalism, there are also many uncensored posts advocating for the
adoption of multi-party competition, describing reform as the only way to empower the
Chinese people and to rein in corruption. We include several examples in our supplemen-
tary materials.
Finally, we sought and identified social media volume bursts related to three highly
salient and politically sensitive issues about real world events that did not have collective
action potential. These are discussions related to Tibet, Uyghurs, and Ai Weiwei.
First is the case of a volume burst in Tibet: In early August 2013, a post by a woman
who claimed to have spurred her true love in order to marry a man who lived within view
of Lhasa’s Potala Palace went viral. As expected, censorship of posts in this burst is low
at 12%.
Second is a volume burst related to Xinjiang and Uyghurs, which occurred in March
2013, where a post poking fun at a government entity with an exceptionally long, 54
character name (新疆维吾尔自治区乌鲁 木齐国家高新技术产业开发区社会管
理综合治理委员会学校及周边治安综合治 理工作领导小组办公室) went viral.
The government entity is located in Xinjiang, and the name can be roughly translated as
the “Public Security and Management Office of the Working Small Group of the Holis-
tic Social Management Committee’s School and Surrounding Areas of Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region Urumqi’s Chinese High Tech Development Zone.” This post was
the butt of jokes and satire related to Chinese government bureaucracy, but completely
unrelated to any on-going collective action event. As expected, censorship of this volume
burst was low, only 10%.
Finally, we identified a volume burst related to artists, including Ai Weiwei along with
Matisse, Picasso, Andy Warhol and others, and their cats. Censorship of this burst was
also low, at 6%. Our definition of collective action potential includes real world events
related to those who have catalyzed or organized collective action in the past. This volume
burst relates to Ai Weiwei but falls outside the definition because the burst is not related
to a real world event, nor is it solely related to Ai Weiwei.
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5 Concluding Remarks
We offer the first large scale randomized experimental analysis of censorship in China,
along with participant observation of how censorship is conducted. We use these designs
to conduct a rigorous test of the theory of collective action potential, and to further uncover
and resolve academic conflicts about crucial aspects of the Chinese censorship program.
With them we are able to subject to empirical estimation what had previously been left
to statistical assumption. We are also able to study the large program whereby enormous
numbers of social media submissions are put into limbo before being considered for possi-
ble publication or censorship. Whereas censorship is a publish-first-censor-later process,
automated review involves a review-first-maybe-publish-later process.
Our flexible research designs also enabled us to study edge cases, just beyond the
reigning theory of collective action potential, so that we can define the boundaries of
where it applies. This includes the effects of highly salient and sensitive topics about
events without collective action potential; posts about corruption; posts that name Chi-
nese leaders specifically; and collective action events that are solely on the Internet or
about collective action on the ground outside the Chinese mainland — none of which are
predicted by the theory of collective action potential to be censored more than others, and
which our data clearly shows is not censored more than other non-collective action topics.
We also show that academic controversies over confusing interpretations of which key-
words are being censored in automated review is resolved once we realize that the Chinese
government is surprisingly flexible over what methods and technology each social media
site can use, even while imposing uniformity of results by requiring post hoc censoring
by human coders.
Future researchers should consider comparing these results on censorship in social
media with censorship in traditional media and other ways the Chinese government im-
pedes the free flow of information.
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